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RULE 11 SANCTIONS AND STANDARDS: BLUNTING
THE JUDICIAL SWORD
ROBERT E. OLIPHANTt
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides federal
courts with a means of imposing sanctions on attorneys forfilingfriv-
olous law suits. Even though the Rule addresses the ever-growing
problem of judicial economy, Professor Oliphant suggests that addi-
tional standards are necessary to assist the judiciary in effectively ap-
plying the Rule in future cases. The standards discussed in this
Article are designed to promote a more uniform application of Rule
11.
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INTRODUCTION
The American judiciary is growing increasingly bold in its
imposition of fines and other sanctions for abuse of process in
civil litigation. This boldness is a reaction to the escalating
volume of litigation, recent changes in the Federal Rules of
t Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
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Civil Procedure, I and an impatience with inappropriate and
costly tactics associated with some litigation performances by
attorneys.
This Article will examine some of the events which led to the
development of stricter rules aimed at attorneys whose con-
duct, while not of such a nature as to place them in contempt
of court, nevertheless warrants judicial intervention. Primary
emphasis is placed on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 2 and the increased use of the sanction provisions
within that Rule. The Article will briefly trace the roots of the
sanction provisions found in Rule 11, and critically explore the
current procedures and standards employed by judges when
sanctions are considered. The Article also contains a number
of suggestions aimed at reducing the possibility that unreason-
able, arbitrary sanctions will be imposed on lawyers, their cli-
ents, or pro se litigants.
I. EVENTS WHICH FOSTERED THE NEED FOR STRICTER
CONTROL OVER THE LAWYERING PROCESS
There is no question that the wheels of American civil justice
are grinding ever more slowly. The inability of the judicial sys-
tem to respond to its citizens effectively and economically is an
issue of major concern.
Despite the advent of computerized recordkeeping, modern
word processing equipment, and the addition of hundreds of
judges, law clerks, and secretaries, the judicial system contin-
ues to swelter beneath a growing pile of litigation demands.
The system struggles against becoming a place of legal inepti-
tude as did the Chancery court portrayed by the nineteenth
century social critic Charles Dickens in his classic tale Bleak
House.
One reason for the skyrocketing litigation is the enormous
increase in the number of lawyers in America.3 Today, there is
one lawyer for every 400 citizens.4 In 1980, there was approxi-
1. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended in 1983 specifi-
cally "to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions." FED. R. Civ. P. 11,
advisory committee notes.
2. For the complete text of Rule 11, see infra note 14.
3. See Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG. 38, 40 (May-June 1983), reprinted in 33J.
LEGAL EDUC. 570, 571 (1983). See also Kester, Are Lawyers Becoming Public Enemy
Number One?, THE WASHINGTONIAN 114, 116 (Feb. 1984).
4. J. WRIGHT, THE AMERICAN ALMANAC OF JOBS AND SALARIES 365 (1982).
[Vol. 12
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mately one lawyer for every 325 citizens. 5 In 1950, there was
approximately one lawyer for every 750 citizens.6 It is esti-
mated that by the mid-1990's there will be 1,000,000 lawyers
in the United States.
7
The expansion of law schools during the seventies resulted
in the tremendous increase in new attorney graduates, and
with those graduates came the crush of new filings. Conse-
quently, a corresponding need for more judges and adminis-
trative support personnel followed on the heels of the attorney
explosion. Statistics from the federal system reflect the enor-
mity of the litigation problem.
Federal district court filings more than doubled during the
past ten years, and trials lasting thirty days or more have trip-
led in number.8 One hundred years ago there were fifty-five
United States district judges, nine United States circuit judges,
and thirty-nine state supreme courts. Today, there are 758
district judges, 226 circuit judges authorized, and about
27,000 state court judges. 9 When Chief Justice Warren took
office at the beginning of the 1953 term of the United States
Supreme Court, there were 1,463 cases on the docket; in the
term endingJuly, 1985, there were 5,100.10
Americans have become the most litigious people in the his-
tory of the world. Even when a traditional avenue of redress is
foreclosed, such as occurred with the advent of the "no-fault"
motor vehicle insurance in many states, attorneys find new,
more creative, and imaginative litigation avenues. For exam-
ple, complex age, sex, antitrust, and race discrimination cases,
have become a regular part of the grist of the federal court
system. As a result, these cases have partially filled the no-fault
void. Class actions involving claims of millions of dollars are
not unusual, and verdicts well in excess of a million dollars are
not uncommon. To some, the legal system has become the
place to prospect for the pot of gold at the "end of the litiga-
5. See id.
6. See id. The number of attorneys in the United States has doubled since 1960.
Bok, supra note 3, at 40, reprinted in 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. at 571.
7. One Million Lawyers, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Mar. 1984, at 13.
8. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case
from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 770 (1981).
9. Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger, The Time is Now for the Intercircuit
Panel, 71 A.B.A.J., Apr. 1985, at 86, 87-88.
10. Id. at 87.
1986]
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tion rainbow."" As you might predict, the Chief Justice has
called for more mediation and arbitration in an effort to reduce
the tension on a system which is already overburdened. And,
as you might also predict, the system itself is becoming less
liberal in its openness to any and all claims.
While there are many explanations for the heightened em-
phasis on controlling the lawyering process through promulga-
tion of stricter procedural rules, the dramatic increase in the
number of lawyers has, without doubt, been the primary cata-
lyst. To its credit, the system is proceeding cautiously, evinc-
ing a genuine concern that it not be overreactionary.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF LAWYER SANCTIONS
The idea that lawyers can be the object of sanctions is
neither new nor novel. Lawyer abuse was first addressed by
Congress in 1813 when it adopted legislation providing that
any attorney " 'who multiplied the proceedings in any cause
• .. so as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously'
could be held liable for 'any excess of costs so incurred.' "12
Federal courts have been able to impose sanctions for vexa-
tious and bad faith actions through the exercise of their inher-
ent power to control the proceedings before them.' 3
With the advent of a comprehensive set of federal rules of
civil procedure in 1939, a modest effort was made in Rule 11 to
insure that lawyers who drafted and filed pleadings met a mini-
mum standard before going forward. Accordingly, the Rule
adopted a "good faith" standard. 14 As a practical matter, how-
l 1. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984).
12. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 (1980) (quoting Act ofJuly
22, 1813, 3 Stat. 21).
13. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 765-66. See also Viola Sportswear, Inc. v.
Minum, 574 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
14. The original Rule 11 adopted by the Supreme Court provided:
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings. Every pleading of a party represented
by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his indi-
vidual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented
by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be ver-
ified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses
or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there
is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a
pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this
[Vol. 12
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ever, there is little evidence to suggest that in 1939 sanction
provisions were needed in order to control lawyer pretrial
behavior.
The "good faith" requirement has its roots in former Equity
Rule 24 relating to the signature of counsel and former Equity
Rule 21 relating to scandalous matters. It was developed in
equity where it was seldom used. The "good faith" concept in
old Rule 11 was likewise seldom used in the federal system.
Prior to the 1983 amendment, there were a meager number of
reported cases in which sanctions were applied to errant law-
yers.' 5 One study indicated that between 1938 and 1976, there
were only twenty-three reported cases in which a party invoked
former Rule 11 to strike a pleading and only nine cases in
which violations of Rule 11 were found. 16 According to the
Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 amendment to Rule
11, there was a great deal of confusion over the application of
the prior rule, the standards required of attorneys, and the
availability of appropriate sanctions.' 7
As noted above, courts applying old Rule 11 believed that
only a willful violation could subject an attorney to sanctions.
To show willfulness, a party seeking sanctions had to demon-
strate subjective bad faith on the part of the party opponent.
This burden of proof was obviously difficult to meet. Courts
were reluctant to discipline attorneys under the old Rule for
objective misconduct "attributable to mistake, inadvertence or
error of judgment." '8
rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as
though the pleadings had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule
an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar ac-
tion may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
Order Adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 308 U.S. 649, 676 (1939) (or-
der dated Dec. 20, 1937).
15. See, e.g., Rhinehart v. Stauffer, 638 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1979).
16. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "'Striking" Problems with
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (1976).
17. The Advisory Committee Notes on the 1983 amendment state the following:
There has been considerable confusion as to (1) the circumstances that
should trigger striking a pleading or motion or taking disciplinary action,
(2) the standard of conduct expected of attorneys who sign pleadings and
motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate sanctions. The new
language is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions,
by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those
obligations by the imposition of sanctions.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee notes (citations omitted).
18. In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1035 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting portions of Rule 8).
1986]
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By 1983, the litigation crunch set the stage for a reform initi-
ative in the federal system. As a result, Rule 11 and several
other pretrial rules were amended.' 9 The amendments were
designed to provide the judiciary with tools for more effective
management of the cases coming to it, as well as to create
, stricter standards for dealing with abusive lawyer pretrial
behavior. 20
Along with Rule 11, Rules 7(b), 16, and 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were also amended. Rule 7 was
amended to make it clear that sanctions could be imposed in
motion practice. 2' Rule 16 was amended to give the judiciary
greater control over filing, as well as control over the negotia-
tion stage of a proceeding. 22 Rule 16(f) illustrates the nature
of the control courts are expected to wield. For example, it
authorizes imposition of sanctions for failing to participate in
good faith in pretrial proceedings. 23 Amended Rule 26 fo-
cuses on the problem of abusive discovery and provides the
judiciary with enlarged power to limit and control discovery.
Rule 26(g) provides for sanctions for abuse of the discovery
process, by imposing a certification requirement similar to that
under Rule 11 with respect to discovery requests and
responses. 24
Since its amendment in 1983, Rule 11 has drawn particular
attention. The amendment was designed to provide judges
with the necessary tools to curb frivolous litigation and abusive
motion practices.25 Consequently, the amendment provides
judges with the power to objectively26 measure a lawyer's pre-
19. Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983).
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee notes.
21. The 1983 amendment created Rule 7(b). The Advisory Committee Notes
provide:
One of the reasons sanctions against improper motion practice have
been employed infrequently is the lack of clarity of Rule 7. That rule has
stated only generally that the pleading requirements relating to captions,
signing, and other matters of form also apply to motions and other papers.
The addition of Rule 7(b)(3) makes explicit the applicability of the signing
requirement and the sanctions of Rule 11, which have been amplified.
FED. R. Civ. P. 7, advisory committee notes.
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16, advisory committee notes.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
25. See, e.g., Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 757 n.4.
26. Despite the apparent objective nature of this standard, the Seventh Circuit in
two opinions emphasized that Rule 11 requires a finding of subjective bad faith on
the part of the person against whom fees are to be assessed. Suslick v. Rothschild
[Vol. 12
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trial behavior and control through the use of sanctions. 27 It
was hoped that the creation of a clearer, narrower standard
would more effectively highlight lawyers' obligations when fil-
ing complaints or bringing motions.
28
The core of Rule 1 1 is the declaration that the signature on a
pleading certifies that "to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion and belief formed after reasonable inquiry [the pleading,
motion, or other paper] is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the exten-
Securities Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 1984); Badillo v. Central Steel &
Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1167 (7th Cir. 1983). Although what constitutes subjective
bad faith in the eyes of the Seventh Circuit is not exactly clear, the Suslick court did
imply that a claim lacking a colorable basis in law would justify the award offers. It is
clear that the Seventh Circuit has recognized the propriety of assessing fees in cases
involving parties who claim not to owe income taxes or who file frivolous tax appeals.
See Granzow v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 265, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1984). Other circuits
have also awarded costs for groundless actions involving tax laws. See, e.g., Parker v.
Commissioner, 724 F.2d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying FED. R. App. P. 38);
United States v. Hart, 701 F.2d 749, 750 (8th Cir. 1983); McCoy v. Commissioner,
696 F.2d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 1983).
27. See, e.g., Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 757 n.4.
28. The following text indicates the additions and deletions effected by the 1983
amendment (italics indicates additions, brackets deletions):
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings
Motions and Other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name,
whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attor-
ney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not
be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the aver-
ments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is
abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief [there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay] formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing laws and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader or movant [or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of the rule; it
may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the
pleading has not been served. For a willful violation of this rule an attorney
may be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be
taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.] If a pleading, motion or
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion,
or other paper, including a reasonable attorney 's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
1986]
7
Oliphant: Rule 11 Sanctions and Standards: Blunting the Judicial Sword
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA I4 REVIEW
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law... *"29 The
language requires that an attorney have more than just a belief
that the law is or should be a certain way. The Advisory Com-
mittee Notes state, "what constitutes a reasonable inquiry may
depend on . . .whether the pleading, motion, or other paper
was based on a plausible view of the law," and is thus a more
stringent standard than the original standard of "good
faith."
30
Amended Rule 11 applies to every paper filed in court; not
merely the initial pleadings. 3' It also applies to pro se litigants
as well as attorneys and parties .2 The rule places an obliga-
tion on the moving party to conduct a reasonable prefiling in-
quiry with respect to both facts and law.33 Papers filed with the
court must be well grounded in fact and warranted by existing
law or by a good faith argument for its extension, modification,
or reversal. 34 Therefore, papers may not be interposed for de-
lay, to harass, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.35
Courts are given wide latitude in terms of what sanctions theymay impose either on counsel or the client.36 Reasonable ex-
penses, including attorney fees, may be imposed for violation
of the Rule.
37
The drafters considered and specifically rejected the prior
requirement that an attorney's conduct must be "willful"
before sanctions may be imposed. The committee comments
and recent decisions make it abundantly clear that it is not nec-
essary to demonstrate "subjective" bad faith in order to justify
imposition of sanctions. The Advisory Committee Notes de-
clare that the "standard is one of reasonableness under the cir-
cumstances," 38 and expressly refer to the fact that wilfullness is
no longer a prerequisite to disciplinary action.3 9
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
30. Id. advisory committee notes.




35. Id. advisory committee notes.
36. Id.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See, e.g., Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F.
Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984); Driscoll v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 174
(D.C. Ill. 1980).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee notes.
39. Id. The references in the former text to wilfulness as a prerequisite to disci-
plinary action has been deleted.
[Vol. 12
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Amended Rule 11 requires a much more serious preinstitu-
tion inquiry by attorneys or pro se litigants than did its prede-
cessor.40 The Rule applies not only to frivolous proceedings
and those brought in bad faith, but also to proceedings which,
although not without merit, constitute an abuse of legal pro-
cess because they are initiated for an improper purpose. Ap-
propriate application of Rule 11 by the judiciary "should
discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline
the litigation process. '" 4'
Amended Federal Rule 1 1 has already made a significant im-
pact on state civil procedure. Since its amendment in 1983,
Arizona, 42 Kentucky, 43 Michigan, 44 Wisconsin, 45 and Minne-
sota4 6 have adopted similar provisions. Several other states
have also adopted sanctions for inappropriate behavior.
4 7
The immediate objective of sanctions is to compensate the
opposing party for the time and expense spent on the matter
and to punish the offender for wasting the limited time and
resources of the court. The long-term objective is to deter
frivolous pleadings, thereby reducing the number of frivolous
cases taken to the court. Deterring frivolous pleadings also,
however, serves another purpose; specifically, it protects liti-
gants in other cases whose motion and trial dates are delayed
because the court must spend time on the frivolous matters.
Compensation will more likely be the objective when the de-
fendant files a motion seeking a monetary award, while deter-
40. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 308 U.S. 676 (1939), amended by FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 461
U.S. 1099 (1983) ("The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay..." with
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 ("The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and beliefformed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extention,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any im-
proper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation. . . .) (emphasis added).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee notes.
42. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 11 (a).
43. Ky. R. Civ. P. 11.
44. MICH. CT. R. 2.114.
45. WIs. STAT. ANN. 814.025 (West Supp. 1985).
46. MINN. R. Civ. P. 11.
47. Fruin, Inherent Power Sanctions Can Help Deal with Litigation Abuse When Lawyers
Bend the Court Out of Shape, JUDGES L.J., Fall 1982, at 14, 17.
1986]
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rence will be cited more often if the court raises the issue on its
own motion.
Adoption of the new standards is aimed at reducing the
problem of court calendar congestion. While an admirable
goal, its achievement is a long way off. In addition, the new
standards have created additional legal difficulties. One of
these difficulties is the extent to which constitutional protec-
tions will be afforded lawyers and litigants prior to the imposi-
tion of sanctions.
III. PROTECTING THE LAWYER AND LITIGANT:
WHAT PROCESS IS DUE?
A major area of concern is the potential for selective, arbi-
trary imposition of sanctions against different lawyers appear-
ing before the same judge. The possibility of differing
standards being applied by various judges within the same fed-
eral district or state court system is of similar concern. Worse,
there is a possibility of different standards being applied by the
same judge for identical misconduct. Absent a uniform ap-
proach and an application of agreed upon standards among
the judiciary, the potential for arbitrariness exists. Without ar-
ticulation of clear standards, a climate of uneasiness, wariness,
and confusion will persist. The development of standards
through local rules will diminish anxiety in this area.
Standards are needed to assist judges in setting the amount
of the penalty in a given case, as well as to suggest alternatives
to financial sanctions. Financial penalties should not be the
only remedy considered when sanctions are to be imposed. It
is obvious that monetary sanctions alone will not act as a deter-
rent to errant lawyering practices in every case. Financial pen-
alties in the form of sanctions may, however, have greater
indirect deterrent value. The adverse publicity generated by
imposition of a fine as a sanction may have an impact on a law-
yer's reputation in the community at large as well as among his
peers at the bar.48 A statement by the court and the subse-
quent publication of an opinion that counsel's conduct has
been subject to sanction amounts to a public censure. Such a
statement may have a detrimental impact in the future of a law-
48. A sanction may besmirch a lawyer's reputation and embodies a kind of "crim-
inal hallmark." See Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729, 730 (3d Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 12
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Because of the impact sanctions may have on a lawyer's rep-
utation and his finances, basic fairness dictates that those inter-
ests be given due process consideration. Due process
standards, which provide the opportunity for notice and hear-
ing, are essential means of preventing judicial mistakes. Due
process standards also guard against arbitrary and capricious
judicial behavior. Three decisions by the United States
Supreme Court shed some light on the due process require-
ments when the issue involves imposition of a sanction.
Over twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court in Societe In-
ternational Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers,5 0 reversed on due process grounds a district court's dis-
missal of an action because the plaintiff failed to produce cer-
tain documents when ordered to do so.5' Although the case
argued for a thorough due process analysis, one was not given.
Rather, the Supreme Court made it clear that federal courts
possessed inherent power to impose sanctions for lawyer con-
duct which did not constitute contempt.52 The opinion left un-
certain the reach of the courts and the minimum protections
required prior to imposition of sanctions. 53
Societe Internationale was followed by Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper. 54 In Roadway, the Court approved the use of its inherent
power to impose monetary sanctions on trial counsel in appro-
priate circumstances. In doing so, it relied in part on an earlier
decision, Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 55 where the Court had
49. Public sanctions may be extremely damaging to an attorney's reputation.
Reputation as well as financial interests are entitled to due process consideration. In
Wisconsin v. Constineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), the Supreme Court said, "[w]here a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Id.
at 437.
50. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
51. Id. at 203. The trial judge had dismissed with prejudice a party's complaint
where it had failed to comply with a court order under Rule 34 to produce Swiss
banking records. Id. at 203. The Court said that dismissal was not warranted where
disclosure would have subjected the party to criminal sanctions in Switzerland. Id. at
211-12.
52. Id. at 206-07 (court stated that the case should not rest upon Rule 41 or upon
the district court's "inherent power" to impose sanctions).
53. In National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976), the Supreme Court approved dismissal of an action for bad faith failure to
comply with discovery orders.
54. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
55. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
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affirmed a lower court dismissal of a complaint for lack of pros-
ecution. In Roadway, the Court said, "[s]ince the assessment of
counsel fees is a less severe sanction than outright dismissal,
Link strongly supports [the assessment of money sanctions.]"
56
The Court characterized sanctions as an important vehicle for
"deterrence and punishment." 57 It announced that federal
courts must apply sanctions "diligently both 'to penalize those
whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction,
[and] to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in
the absence of such a deterrent.' "58 The Court also discussed
the due process implications associated with imposition of
sanctions. "Like other sanctions," wrote the Court, "attor-
ney's fees should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and
an opportunity for a hearing on the record. "59
Despite the notice and hearing language in Roadway, the
Court did not hold that notice and a hearing are always re-
quired. Link, which was cited favorably by the Court, upheld
imposition of sanctions against due process claims.6o The dis-
trict judge, in Link, dismissed the case after counsel had de-
faulted and failed to attend a hearing. 6' The attorney had
called the clerk's office and explained that he could not attend
the hearing, but gave no details. 62 When the case was called,
the trial judge noted the attorney's absence and then sua sponte
dismissed the case.
63
The Supreme Court in Link, stated:
The adequacy of notice and hearing respecting proceedings
that may affect a party's rights turns, to a considerable ex-
tent, on the knowledge which the circumstances show such
party may be taken to have of the consequences of his own
conduct. The circumstances here were such as to dispense
with the necessity for advance notice and hearing.
64
56. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 765.
57. Id. at 763-64.
58. Id. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), the Supreme Court said,
-[t]here have been repeated expressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled
discovery, and voices from this Court have joined the chorus." Id. at 176. The court
also stated that "judges should not hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the
discovery process." Id. at 177.
59. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767 (emphasis added).
60. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962).
61. Id. at 628-29.
62. Id. at 627-28.
63. Id. at 628-29.
64. Id. at 632.
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Thus, the Court apparently has taken the position that no
hearing is constitutionally compelled in certain circumstances
where established rules are transgressed. 65 One immediate diffi-
culty, of course, is determining what are "established rules."
These decisions provide a starting point for exploring the
nature and extent of procedural protections that should be af-
forded litigants and counsel prior to imposition of sanctions.
To some extent, the decisions also reflect the temerity with
which courts in the past have viewed the issue of attorney sanc-
tions less than contempt. The time has arrived, however, for
courts to abandon such temerity. Even attorneys who see
themselves as vigilant guardians of every aspect of a client's
case, no longer oppose stronger judicial involvement in the
pretrial area. They have become convinced of the need for
greater involvement from firsthand participation in the system.
In fact, attorneys have experienced the atmosphere of lawless-
ness created by an opponent who has regularly missed dead-
lines, filed frivolous motions (and complaints), refused to
cooperate in settlement conferences, and was otherwise
noncooperative.
The judiciary has only recently begun to pay significant at-
tention to initiation of a law suit. In the past, cases were si-
lently filed with the clerk of court and unobtrusively made their
way to the court docket for settlement, or eventually, to trial.
The judiciary viewed itself as a passive, detached arbiter of citi-
zen disputes. However, of necessity, the role of the judiciary is
changing fast, and the 1983 amendments reflect that change.
Judges have become case managers and docket controllers.
They are asserting management control through stricter appli-
cation of procedural rules, increased settlement and manage-
ment conferences, and the imposition of sanctions.
Concomitantly, they can no longer enjoy the status of passive
arbiter.
The concern for efficiency and management provides added
importance to the development of due process standards for
the protection of attorneys. Justice should not, after all, be
65. The power to punish without notice and a hearing was said in In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1948) (a direct contempt proceeding), to be a "departure from ac-
cepted standards of due process... " Id. at 274. But some form of notice and
hearing-formal or informal-is required before deprivation of property interest that
"cannot be characterized as de minimns. - Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.21
(1972) (citing Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969)).
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sacrificed on the altar of expediency. The principal question
is: where should the judiciary go from here?
One recommendation is to encourage the rapid develop-
ment of more detailed, articulated procedures among the vari-
ous courts. Model procedural rules, for example, could be
developed at a national or circuit court level. It is envisioned
that the model rules would provide the basic structure for dis-
cussion, which would eventually lead to adoption of local rules
by various trial courts. Local rules will improve consistency
among trial judges, reduce uneasiness of lawyers regarding im-
position of sanctions, and insure that an adequate record is
made of each occurrence. Thus, the integrity of the process
would be protected, and the result should be a fair and worka-
ble system.
California has experience with developing procedures to
protect lawyers who are about to be sanctioned. The experi-
ence grew out of a 1978 decision, Bauguess v. Paine.66 In that
case, the California Supreme Court was asked to determine the
nature and extent of the California courts' inherent or nonstat-
utory power to assess monetary sanctions against litigants for
improper litigation tactics. It held that in the absence of ex-
press statutory authority, a trial court's ability to sanction law-
yers was limited to contempt. 67 The primary reason for
rejecting the inherent power doctrine was the court's concern
over the absence of procedural protections for lawyers and liti-
gants.68 The court also felt that the contempt power was suffi-
cient to control errant counsel and that it contained within its
statutory procedural framework safeguards against judicial ar-
bitrariness. 69 The court stated that "[t]he use of courts' inher-
ent power to punish misconduct by awarding attorney's fees
may imperil the independence of the bar and therefore under-
mine the adversary system." 70
The decision, in Bauguess, spawned a successful effort by the
California Judges Association to obtain legislation which re-
versed the result. As a part of the legislative effort, the follow-
ing procedural requirement was adopted:
66. 22 Cal. 3d 626, 586 P.2d 942 (1978).
67. See id. at 637-38, 586 P.2d at 948-49.
68. Id. at 638, 586 P.2d at 949.
69. Id.
70. 22 Cal. 3d at 638, 586 P.2d at 949.
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Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be imposed
except on notice contained in a party's moving or respond-
ing papers; or the court's own motion, after notice and op-
portunity to be heard. An order imposing expenses shall be
in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circum-
stances justifying the order.
71
While requirements of notice and hearing are essential to
prevent arbitrary imposition of sanctions, they may prove to be
time consuming for court and counsel. It is ironic that the pro-
visions designed to deter litigation abuse may result in increas-
ing the clutter of the already overburdened channels of
litigation.
Besides the fundamental question of notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard, there are a number of other related questions
needing answers. Questions such as the limits of the Supreme
Court's decision in Link, the possibility of a bifurcated hearing
where a lawyer's client is barred, the need for a detailed rec-
ord, the possibility of using sanction options other than finan-
cial penalties, and the basic question of what standards to use
when assessing attorney fees need to be examined. Difficult
issues, such as when a court may dispense with advance notice
and a hearing because a lawyer is assumed to already possess
sufficient knowledge of the consequences of his own conduct,
need analysis and resolution.
There remains a question in some judicial minds as to
whether Rule 11 mandates application of an objective stan-
dard. 72 Some believe, for example, that the Seventh Circuit
has taken the position that a subjective standard still applies. 73
In sanctioning errant taxpayers under Rule 11, the district
court judge in Cameron v. LR.S. 74 found that the plaintiffs' insis-
tence on litigating their claim despite controlling precedents
that removed any colorable basis in law was sufficient evidence
to show subjective bad faith which according to the court, was
the applicable standard. A careful reading of Badillow v. Central
Steel & Wire Co., 75 upon which the Cameron decision was based,
indicates that the court was discussing Rule 11 as it existed
71. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 128.5(c) (West Supp. 1986).
72. Rauenhorst v. U.S., 104 F.R.D. 588, 605 (1985).
73. See Cameron v. I.R.S., 593 F. Supp. 1540, 1557 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
74. Id. at 1557.
75. 717 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1983).
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before the amendment. 76 Any remaining question of whether
subjective bad faith is required before sanctions may be im-
posed can be laid to rest by clear local rules.
It also has been suggested that under certain circumstances,
the question of sanctions should be addressed to an attorney in
a separate judicial proceeding outside the presence of a client.
It has been argued that in such a setting counsel can argue his
own case against imposition of sanctions and not be bound by
that of his client.7 7 Such a suggestion raises critical questions
regarding the fundamental nature of the attorney-client rela-
tionship, and suggests a divergent shift in our thinking on the
lawyering process. Such proposals need thoughtful discussion
and careful analysis before adoption.
There are numerous other issues of lesser importance, but
which nevertheless need deliberation. For example, when
should a detailed transcript of a sanction proceeding be pre-
pared? When should a trial judge make oral findings rather
than written findings? Does the power of the court permit it to
use sanctions to reimburse the judicial system for time need-
lessly spent in a courtroom by administrative personnel as well
as the judge because of attorney misconduct?
Another issue needing agreement involves conduct of coun-
sel. Should courts be less inclined to grant attorney fee awards
where counsel is nonobstructionist and forthright in admitting
a mistake? 78 Should lawyers, who are inexperienced in the
particular court system, be given special treatment by the
court? Should new law graduates be treated more gently? Lo-
cal rules should address these questions and questions of miti-
gation and extenuation.
Ground rules regarding the use of formal and informal con-
ferences between erring counsel and the trial judge should be
established. With experienced trial judges and lawyers, com-
mon sense suggestions on the most appropriate approaches to
use will not be difficult to draft.
76. See id. at 1166-67. It does not support the position that Rule II mandates
application of a subjective standard.
77. An example of the type of investigation required of an attorney before filing
a suit in federal courts is illustrated in such cases as Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road
Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1250 (D. Minn. 1984).
78. See, e.g., Pudlo v. Director, 587 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (the dis-
trict judge indicated that counsel's confession of error was a favorable factor in con-
sidering whether sanctions under Rule I I should be imposed).
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Another issue needing resolution involves the standards to
be used in establishing the appropriate size of a monetary pen-
alty. Should it make a difference whether the case involves a
single client or a giant conglomerate? Should the experience
of counsel play a role in establishing the amount of the mone-
tary sanction? Furthermore, what should a trial judge do
about imposition of monetary fines when the other side makes
no request for them?
79
Should the following procedure, for example, be adopted as
the proper procedure to use when sanctions are imposed? As-
sume the court has decided that sanctions are warranted. The
moving or petitioning attorney under a new local rule presents
the judge with detailed time records of the hours expended by
every lawyer on the case. The records should be sufficiently
detailed so the judge will have a clear understanding of the
nature of the the work done, the status of each lawyer who
worked on the case, and the hours expended.80 The fee appli-
cant provides specific evidence of the prevailing rate in the
community for the type of work for which he seeks an award.
Attached to the request are affidavits reciting the fees similarly
qualified attorneys have received from paying clients in compa-
rable cases. 81
There is little reason justifying delay in developing and
promulgating standards and guidelines which either adopt or
modify existing procedures such as the attorney fee example
set forth in the previous paragraph. Most of the issues and
problems are apparent and need not await a case-by-case reso-
lution. Delaying until a series of decisions has carved out a
procedural path is a clumsy, costly, and inefficient method of
dealing with these problems. There already exist a reasonable
number of decisions which sharpen the issues and answer
many of the questions being raised. In the remaining sections
of this Article, several of those decisions will be discussed.
79. Attorney fees and costs for delay and frivolous appeals are given regularly.
See Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 475 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1973); see, e.g., Wood v.
Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 699 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1445 (1984).
80. See Pekarsky v. Ariyoshi, 575 F. Supp. 673 (D. Hawaii 1983).
81. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 590 F. Supp. 852, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
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IV. UNJUSTIFIED RESISTANCE OF INDISPUTED CLAIM BY THE
DEFENDANT
While most of the attention of the Rule 1I certification re-
quirement has focused on the plaintiff and frivolous or un-
founded actions against parties, as much (or arguably more)
emphasis should be placed on the defendant's obligation to
properly respond to a complaint. When a defendant causes
unwarranted expense for the opponent or the courts by re-
sisting without justification an indisputable claim, he should be
considered for sanctions under Rule 11. By his actions, the
defendant is wasting both private and judicial resources.
Precedent for assessing attorney fees against a defendant
whose resistance was unjustified can be found in a non-Rule 11
decision, Vaughan v. Atkinson.8 2 In this case, a seaman brought
suit in admiralty against his former employer. The employer
failed, without justification, to respond to the seaman's claim
for maintenance and cure.83 The seaman was awarded attor-
ney's fees under the rubric of compensatory damages. The
Supreme Court, however, emphasized the role that the defend-
ant's bad faith played in the court's decision.8 4 The Court
found that as a result of the defendant's callous attitude and
recalcitrance in neither admitting nor denying the claim, the
plaintiff had been forced to hire an attorney to get what plainly
was owed to him under well-settled law.85 Under the new Rule
11, the defendant's obligation goes much further than the test
applied by the court in Vaughan. A defendant's obligation is
identical to that of the plaintiff in terms of examination of ex-
isting law and conducting a reasonable factual inquiry. As
plaintiffs become more aware of the Rule's significance in
terms of its use to reduce frivolous, tactically-delaying answers,
more sanctions involving defense counsel can be anticipated.
82. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
83. Id. at 528-29.
84. Id. at 530-31.
85. Id. The court stated:
In the instant case respondents were callous in their attitude, making no
investigation of libellant's claim and by their silence neither admitting nor
denying it. As a result of that recalcitrance, libellant was forced to hire a
lawyer and to go court to get what was plainly owed him under laws that are
centuries old. The default was willful and persistent. It is difficult to imag-
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V. WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE FACTUAL INQUIRY?
It is evident from recent case law that courts are moving
away from the subjective, bad faith standard of evaluating pre-
trial lawyering behavior in favor of the objective standard. Van
Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Machinery is indicative of this trend.
86
Following a hearing, the trial judge sanctioned the plaintiff's
lawyer, citing noncompliance with Rule 11 because he failed to
properly investigate the facts before filing the action. 87 The
trial judge also sanctioned him under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for un-
reasonably and vexatiously multiplying the proceedings by re-
fusing to dismiss the action when it became clear it was time
barred.
88
The facts which led to imposition of sanctions arose from a
serious farm accident. The plaintiff lost his right arm on Sep-
tember 6, 1976 while using a corn chopper that was manufac-
tured, sold, and distributed by the defendant corporation. 89
Seven years later, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant,
basing his theories of recovery on negligence, strict liability,
and breach of express and implied warranties. The complaint
alleged that the accident occurred on September 6, 1977. The
accident, however, actually occurred exactly one year earlier.
As a result of the error, the action was time barred.90
The defendant discovered that the claim was time barred
while examining hospital records made when the plaintiff was
treated for the injury. 91 Upon discovery, defense counsel in-
formed plaintiff's counsel by letter. In his letter, defense
counsel also enclosed a copy of the medical records showing
precisely the date the injury was treated.92 A week later, de-
fense counsel called plaintiff's attorney asking that the action
be dismissed. The telephone call was later confirmed by a sec-
ond letter. This correspondence contained a clipping from a
local newspaper reporting the accident. The clipping was in-
tended to further confirm that plaintiff had not timely filed the
matter. Defense counsel then filed a formal summary judg-
86. 581 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984).
87. Id. at 1251.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. The statute of limitations period for the action was six years. MINN. STAT.
§ 541.05 (1985).
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ment motion asking for judgment as well as an award of costs
and attorney fees.
93
At the summary judgment hearing, the plaintiff did not file a
responsive memorandum in advance of the hearing.94 How-
ever, on the issues of costs, attorney fees, and improper inves-
tigation, the plaintiff's attorney offered a personal affidavit
stating that "his client had told him the accident happened on Sep-
tember 6, 1977, that he had no reason to believe otherwise, and that he
acted in good faith and believed his client acted in good faith. " 95
When asked what investigation he had made before filing the
action, the attorney said that an expert witness examined the
machine, that he had talked to the plaintiff and family members
at their farm home, and that he had received copies of the op-
erator's and owner's manuals. 96 The attorney admitted that he
did not obtain or review his client's medical records before
starting the law suit. He did not see the records until they
were furnished by defense counsel four or five months after
the suit was begun.97
The district court rejected counsel's argument that the infor-
mation his client had provided regarding the date of the acci-
dent was sufficient to constitute a "reasonable inquiry" under
Rule 11. The court stated:
Had [counsel] ...made even a minimum investigation into
the facts of this case, he would have determined the accu-
rate date of the accident. The hospital and medical records
reflected it. . . .[H]e had adequate time to obtain and ex-
amine all pertinent records and make additional needful in-
quiry [before instituting the action.]98
93. Id. at 1250. The plaintiffs lawyer in McConnell v. Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116
(9th Cir. 1981), had ignored the relevant statute of limitations. Id. at 117. Plaintiff
had brought a civil rights claim against individuals as well as the government based
on arrests that occurred fifteen years before the complaint was filed. Id. The district
court dismissed on the ground the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Id. On appeal, the plaintiff made no argument as to how the statute of limitations
could be avoided. Id. The appeals court awarded attorney fees against plaintiff's
lawyer under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and FED. R. App. P. 38. McConnell, 661 F.2d at 118.
The attorney argued that the court should not impose sanctions against him because
his client insisted that the appeal be made. Id. at 119. The court of appeals rejected
this argument noting that the lawyer must have known the appeal was frivolous. Id.
at 118.
94. Van Berkel, 581 F. Supp. at 1250.
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The district court also rejected counsel's argument that after
notification that the action was time barred, he was compelled
to continue unless he obtained his client's approval. Counsel
argued that he had an "ethical duty to [his] client" to not dis-
miss the action on his own motion. The court observed the
following:
Attorneys are officers of the court and their first duty is to
the administration of justice. Whenever an attorney's du-
ties to his client conflict with those he owes to the public as
an officer of the court, he must give precedence to his duty
to the public. Any other view would run counter to a princi-
pled system of justice.99
Several specific factors led the Van Berkel court to impose
sanctions. One factor was the amount of time available to the
attorney prior to commencing the action. The attorney was
not "pressed" to take swift action in order to toll the running
of the statute of limitations. The court felt that having a case
in the office for more than a year prior to the statute's expira-
tion compelled the attorney to conduct an independent inves-
tigation to determine the accident date. The requirement of
an independent investigation also draws support from the
court's refusal to accept, in place of an independent investiga-
tion, reliance on a client's version of the event.' 00
Although not expressly discussed in Van Berkel, another fac-
tor in the case seems to have been the defendant's economic
hardship caused by the plaintiff's persistance in pursuing a
time-barred claim. Despite written notification, phone calls,
and other documentation being sent to him, the plaintiff re-
mained fixed in his refusal to dismiss. The court felt the de-
fendant suffered unjustified attorney fees and costs because of
counsel's behavior.
The reasonableness of the defense counsel's actions in attempt-
ing to resolve the matter without additional judicial involve-
ment also may have been a factor. The attorney wrote and
phoned the opposition in a reasonable and timely manner. 0 1
99. Id. at 1251.
100. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee notes (courts are to consider
whether the attorney was forced to rely on the client's version); Wold v. Minerals
Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166, 167 (D. Colo. 1983) (the court ordered defendant's
attorney to pay the plaintiff's attorneys fees due, inter alia, to the failure to make a
reasonable investigation before filing a motion to disqualify).
101. See Van Berkel, 581 F. Supp. at 1251.
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He neither confused nor misled the plaintiff.' 02 Accordingly,
the plaintiff was provided with appropriate notice of defend-
ant's position, including supporting documents.10 3 Thus,
when an attorney gives appropriate advance notice of a partic-
ular fact, and does so in a reasonable fashion as illustrated in
Van Berkel, courts will be much more inclined to impose sanc-
tions on an opponent who forces unwarranted costs by need-
less court appearances.
The clarity of the legal issue is likewise a factor to consider in
weighing the imposition of sanctions. In Van Berkel, once the
facts were known, no argument could be or was made that the
law did not require a dismissal of the claim.
The opinion also helps resolve whether counsel's failure to
conduct a reasonable prefiling inquiry must be "willful" before
Rule 11 sanctions may be employed. Willfulness is not re-
quired nor is it the appropriate standard to be applied.' 0 4 In
rejecting application of the "willfulness" standard, the court
joined other commentators and most other courts who have
carefully examined the 1983 amendment. Attorneys must have
more than a reasonable belief that a client has a cause of action; a
belief in and of itself is simply not sufficient justification for
going forward with an action. Rule 11 requires the lawyer or
party to certify that on the basis of a reasonable factual prefil-
ing inquiry, he believes that the paper has a factual and legal
basis and that it is not interposed for delay.' 0 5 The reasonable
inquiry standard holds an attorney to a higher standard of
knowing his case than under former Rule 11. In addition, the
standard provides for a greater range of circumstances to trig-
ger violation of the existing Rule. Courts recognize that
"there is no position-no matter how absurd-of which an ad-
vocate cannot convince himself."' 0 6 This is the reason the ob-
jective standard was adopted in 1983.
Van Berkel is in line with decisions holding that an attorney
may not persist in claims or defenses beyond a point where
102. See id.
103. Id. at 1249-50.
104. The same objective standard was adopted by Judge Murphy in Rauenhorst v.
United States, 104 F.R.D. 588, 605 (D. Minn. 1985), and by judge Gesell in Weisman
v. Rivlin, 598 F. Supp. 724, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
106. Wells v. Oppenheimer, 101 F.R.D. 358, 359 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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they can no longer be considered well grounded. 10 7 The case
also raised the issue and provided limited guidance on the
question of the amount of protection the rules of professional
conduct give an attorney.10 8 From this opinion it is clear that a
lawyer may not shield himself from sanctions by asserting that
he did only what his client wanted him to do.109 The decision
also makes it clear that an attorney is not a "hired gun" whose
conduct is completely directed by a client. It recognizes the
legitimate obligation of a lawyer to the court, a client, and the
public, and then draws an understandable line between a law-
yer's obligation to a client and to the court and the public.
A decision which is consistent with Van Berkel, but with a dif-
ferent outcome, is Rauenhorst v. United States. 110 The United
States sought relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b)(3) in
several cases previously tried to the court."' The previous
cases arose out of an airplane crash in 1978 in which the pilot
and all five passengers were killed. The trustees for the estates
of the passengers sued the United States for negligence on the
basis that the government's air traffic controllers had not exer-
cised reasonable care in routing the plane around bad weather.
The United States settled with the five passengers' estates for
$3,926,310 and then sought contribution and/or indemnity
from the pilot's estate. The owner of the airplane, Southwest
Aircraft Leasing, Inc. (Southwest) also sued the United States.
In that case, the United States brought a counterclaim for
contribution and/or indemnity against the estate of the pilot.
Southwest's suit against the United States and the United
States' actions against the pilot were consolidated and tried." 12
The court found that government air traffic controllers had
agreed to route the airplane around bad weather, but then
107. See, e.g., Nemeroffv. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350-51 (2d Cir. 1980) (although
the court found the action was commenced in good faith, it remanded to the district
court for a determination of whether during the litigation sufficient facts became
known to the appellants which would demonstrate that a failure at that point to with-
draw the action was in bad faith).
108. Judge Devitt used both Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 as authority for his
decision in Van Berkel, 581 F. Supp. at 1251. He imposed attorney fee sanctions
against plaintiffs attorney in the amount of $2,894. Id.
109. 661 F.2d at 119. An attorney also may not shield himself from sanctions on
the ground that he is not "more" blameworthy than his client. See Blair, 757 F.2d at
1438.
110. Rauenhorst, 104 F.R.D. at 588.
Ill. Id. at 591.
112. Id. at 591-92.
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failed to exercise reasonable care in doing so. 1 13 The plane
crashed after being caught in a thunderstorm and buffeted by
severe downdrafts and updrafts." 14
After the contribution/indemnity case was tried, the govern-
ment learned of the existence of a punch in the gas tank." 15
The punch had been found in the airplane gas tank nearly a
year before trial; however, the government was not informed
of the existence of the punch until after the settlement was
reached with the defendants. 16 As a result, the government
sought a new trial. It claimed that opposing counsel had
wrongfully concealed a critical piece of evidence-the six-inch
long metal punch allegedly found in the rubberized fuel cell of
the aircraft. 1 7 The existence of the punch, and the possibility
that during the turbulent weather it could have perforated the
bladder, were known to several of the parties during the course
of the litigation. This possibility was not revealed to the gov-
ernment until after settlement and trial when an anonymous
tip was received at the United States Attorney's Office concern-
ing a " 'foreign object' which had been found in one of the fuel
tanks of the aircraft."" 8 The government claimed that the
punch was "most probably" the cause of the crash. 1 9 The
government contended that it was entitled to relief under
60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the
grounds of suprise, fraud, misrepresentation, and other mis-
conduct. 120 It named twelve parties in its action for recovery,
all to some degree involved in the prior litigation. 121 The gov-
ernment sought damages in excess of fourteen million dollars
from the attorneys and other parties involved in the settlement
and investigation of the crash and subsequent litigation. 122
The trial judge concluded that the acts and/or omissions put
forth by the United States failed to show any affirmative mis-
conduct on the part of the defendants. Specifically, the court
concluded the defendants had no duty to disclose the punch.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id at 592, 594.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 592-93, 597.
118. Id. at 597.
119. Id. at 593.
120. Id. at 592.
121. Id at 593.
122. Id at 591.
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Defendant's motion asked for attorney fees pursuant to Rule
11. The court rejected the request, reasoning that there was
not sufficient evidence showing that the United States' filings
were "frivolous."'' 23 Further, the court stated that the govern-
ment's filing was based on a "reasonable belief" at the time
that relief was valid. 124 The court noted that the actions of the
United States also did not violate 28 U.S.C. § 1927.125 It fur-
ther observed that the alleged misconduct in filing the com-
plaint must be found to be without a plausible legal or factual
basis and lacking in justification.
126
Rauenhorst is instructive for several reasons. First, the trial
judge correctly observed that courts, when applying Rule 11,
are not to use a subjective or "bad faith" standard. Under ap-
plication of a "bad faith test," no basis existed for considering
imposition of sanctions against the United States. By rejecting
the subjective standard, the trial judge was required to objec-
tively evaluate all the facts in determining whether to impose
sanctions. Second, in applying the objective standard, the
court asked whether the filings were so without factual and
legal foundation that they could be considered frivolous or un-
reasonable. 27 In deciding this question, the court looked at
what was reasonable to believe at the time the complaint was
123. Id. at 605. The court stated:
Applying Rule 11 to the facts and circumstances of this case, the court
concludes that it has not been violated. Under the objective standard, it
cannot be said that the United States filings are so without factual and legal
foundation that they can be considered frivolous or unreasonable. (citations
omitted). Prior to filing these matters, the United States obtained the affida-
vits of Wermerskirchen and Schroeder, both of whom had firsthand knowl-
edge of the punch and the parties' conduct. It also had a copy of a
statement given previously by Schroeder, and it had contacted Donald Sime,
the attorney who had handled the case for the United States. Only after
reviewing the information provided by these individuals did the United
States take action.
Id.
124. Id. The court stated:
The court's rulings on the merits today are not relevant to the inquiry
on sanctions. A court is not to use the wisdom of hindsight but instead
should inquire into what was reasonable to believe at the time the papers were submitted.
(citations omitted). The inquiry made by the United States gave it a sound
basis in law and fact to file its papers seeking relief based on fraud; accord-
ingly, there is no basis for the imposition of any sanctions.
Id. (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 605 n.25.
126. Id.
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filed.' 28 Here, reasonableness was found in the fact that the
government had obtained affidavits from two persons, both of
whom had firsthand knowledge of the punch and of the par-
ties' conduct. 129 The government had also obtained a copy of
a statement previously given by another witness and had con-
tacted the attorney who handled the case for the United States
to verify that he was not provided information regarding the
punch. Only after obtaining this data, did the government
move to set aside the settlementjudgments.130 Thus, a reason-
able factual investigation was made prior to the action-not
later. Finally, the court correctly observed that sanctions will
not necessarily flow from a court's ruling on the merits or a
motion.' 3 1 If a court adopted such a position, virtually every
losing party would be sanctioned.
Blair v. Shenandoah Women's Center, 132 is an illustrative case of
the "frivolous" ineffective litigation at which Rule 11 is aimed.
The plaintiff's attorney in Blair was sanctioned after he
brought a lawsuit against a women's shelter in which his cli-
ent's wife sought refuge from abuse. The attorney included as
defendants the United Way, the state of West Virginia, un-
known police officers, a local board of education, and several
employees of the shelter. The claim sought recovery of ten
million dollars for discrimination based on sex, conspiracy,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, defa-
mation, and harassment.13 3
The defendants initially moved to dismiss for failure to state
a claim. The plaintiff's counsel then filed a series of motions
requesting extensions of time and leave to amend. The trial
court dismissed the baseless complaint after the plaintiff failed
to either amend or respond to defendant's discovery re-
quests. 3 4 The court, after a hearing on defense counsel's dis-
missal motion, concluded that both plaintiff and his attorney
should be sanctioned. In support of the sanction, the court
128. Id. at 605, citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11, advisory committee note, reprinted in





132. 757 F.2d 1435 (4th Cir. 1985).
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noted that Rule 11 applies to conduct during the course of litigation as
well as to the filing of a complaint.
35
The court strongly rejected arguments by plaintiff's attorney
that he was "obliged as [plaintiff's] attorney to make the alle-
gations desired by [his client] and to conduct the case as [the
client] wished." 1 36  In rejecting the arguments, the court
stated:
A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of
the court. He may zealously represent his client, but only
within the bounds of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, as
amended, and the court's inherent power to govern and
regulate the conduct of litigation before it. (citations omit-
ted) We emphatically reject any suggestion that a lawyer
may shield his transgressions behind the simplistic plea that
he only did what his client desired.'
3 7
VI. FAILURE TO PROPERLY APPLY EXISTING LAW OR TO
SUCCESSFULLY ARGUE THE NEED FOR EXTENSION,
MODIFICATION, OR REVERSAL
There are a limited number of pre- and post- 1983 Rule 11
cases which are helpful in determining the nature of the obli-
gation to investigate the existence of law, as well as the stan-
dard for determining whether there existed a basis for
extension, modification, or reversal of it.
Failure to adequately investigate the law surrounding a
court's jurisdiction may result in sanctions. For example, a
complaint without a jurisdictional basis resulted in dismissal and
costs and fees of $1,392 in Overnite Transportation Co. v. Chicago
Industrial Tire Co. 138 The court observed that there was a clear
difference between asserting an unlikely claim and repeatedly
135. Id. The court reasoned as follows:
"[T]his Court has inherent power to assess attorney's fees against an attor-
ney, which power is not limited to cases filed in bad faith but includes ac-
tions leading to the filing of suit and include conduct during the course of
litigation." The district court justified assessing fees against Blair based
both on this inherent power and on Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. It noted, however,
that the August 1, 1983 Amendments to Rule 11 regarding the imposition
of attorney sanctions did not become effective until after Bennett's case was
dismissed.
Id.
136. Id. at 1438.
137. Id. at 1438 (citations omitted).
138. 535 F. Supp. 114, 116 (N.D. Il1. 1982).
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advancing a jurisdictional argument with no basis in law. 139
The plaintiff's lawyer had attempted to pursue a $2,210 claim
in federal court. ' 40 In Textor v. Board of Regents of Northern Illi-
nois University, ' 4' the court found the plaintiff had no conceiva-
ble ground for jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants and
imposed sanction. 1
42
In WSB Electric Co., Inc. v. Rank & File Committee to Stop the 2-
Gate System, "43 an employer who brought an action seeking in-
junctive relief against mass picketing alleged Hobbs Act, RICO
and civil rights conspiracy claims. The employer and its attor-
neys were sanctioned after the court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss. Upon examining the facts and the law, the
court stated it could find neither a factual nor a legal basis for
the plaintiff's complaint. 144
The Internal Revenue Service is particularly aggressive in
seeking attorney fee awards. It was successful in persuading a
trial judge that Rule 11 was violated by a pro se plaintiff who
contended that the Internal Revenue Code did not apply to
him and his wages despite the fact that courts had consistently
ruled that wages are taxable income. 4 5 A recent law school
graduate was given a fifty dollar sanction when he brought an
action against the City of San Francisco and its officials chal-
lenging an ordinance that prohibited him from playing softball
in portions of the public parks. 14 6 The court granted defend-
ant's summary judgment motion on the basis that the claim
was not warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for
its extension. 14 7 The sanction was limited to fifty dollars be-
cause the court considered the attorney's economic situation and
inexperience.
In Pilcher v. Swalec, 148 the defendants had removed a case to
139. Id.
140. Id. at 115. The jurisdictional limit was in excess of $10,000.
141. 87 F.R.D. 751 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
142. In imposing sanctions, the court stated, "[t]his case is fortunately atypical,
but it is also unfortunately symptomatic of some of the ills that afflict the litigation
process. Free access to the courts is essential, but the role of the bar is to make
certain that the right to access is exercised responsibly." Id. at 754.
143. 103 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
144. Id. at 420.
145. Cameron v. I.R.S., 593 F. Supp. 1540, 1558 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
146. Heimbaugh v. City & County of San Francisco, 591 F. Supp. 1573 (D.C. Cal.
1984).
147. Id. at 1577.
148. 540 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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federal court, even though the complaint was based on viola-
tion of the state constitution."4 9 The federal judge remanded
the case, and in doing so, suggested that the plaintiff's lawyer
apply for fees as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1928.150 The court
stated there "[was] no way in which the removal could have
been undertaken in good faith by responsible counsel."' 5'
The complaint clearly stated that the constitutional claims as-
serted were state, not federal constitutional claims.
VII. FAILURE TO CITE RECENT AND CONTROLLING AUTHORITY
Lawyers who advance legal arguments that are clearly wrong
or who ignore controlling authority risk the possibility of sanc-
tions. One of the most noted cases on this issue is Golden Eagle
Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. t52 In this case, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California im-
posed a fine of $3,155 in attorney fees on counsel who had
misled the court by advancing arguments that purported to re-
flect existing law while failing to "cite authority adverse to
movants' position."'' 53 The plaintiff brought an action in Min-
nesota state court for fraud, negligence, and breach of contract
against Burroughs Corporation, the manufacturer of an alleg-
edly defective computer system sold to plaintiff.1 54 The de-
fendant removed to federal court in Minnesota on the basis of
diversity of citizenship, and that court, on defendant's motion,
transferred the action to Federal District Court, Northern Dis-
trict California. 55 The defendant moved for summary judg-
ment alleging that all four claims were time barred under
California law. The plaintiff conceded that the limitations pe-
riod for the contract claim was time barred, but argued that the
limitations period for the remaining claims was governed by
Minnesota law under which they would not be time barred. 56
The defendant then moved to dismiss plaintiff's claim for eco-
nomic loss arising from negligent manufacture as being barred
149. Id. at 1374.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 103 F.R.D. 124 (1984). As of the time this Article was written, the decision
was still pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
153. Id. at 125-27.
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by California law. The motion was denied, and the defendant
was asked to submit a memorandum explaining why sanctions
should not be imposed under Rule 11.157
In its brief to the district court, the defendant cited a 1965
California Supreme Court decision supporting its contention
that economic damages cannot be sought in a negligence case.
The brief, however, omitted mention of a contrary opinion of
the California Supreme Court in 1979.158 The trial judge was
upset because the 1979 decision had been discussed by two
lower appellate courts which the defense also failed to men-
tion. The court stressed the ethics of informing the court of all
applicable case law. 1
59
Sanctions were also applied by the federal district court in
Jorgenson v. County of Volusia, 160 where plaintiff failed to cite two
controlling cases. The court found counsel's actions particu-
larly "reprehensible" because counsel omitted cases he had
157. Id.
158. Id. at 128. The 1979 California ruling did not mention the 1965 decision. In
briefs later submitted by the defendant they argued that the 1965 decision had never
been overruled. Id. at 129.
159. Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D at 127-28.The court was adamant regarding the ethi-
cal considerations of fully informing a court on the applicable law. The court stated:
A court has a right to expect that counsel will state the controlling law
fairly and fully; indeed, unless that is done the court cannot perform its task
properly. A lawyer must not misstate the law, fail to disclose adverse au-
thority (not disclosed by his opponent), or omit facts critical to the applica-
tion of the rules of law relied on.
Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law con-
stitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a
disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of per-
tinent legal authorities. . . . [A]n advocate has a duty to disclose directly
adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction which has not been dis-
closed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argu-
ment is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly
applicable to the case. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 com-
ment (1983).
Ethical Consideration 7-23 under the former ABA Model Code further ex-
plains: "The complexity of law often makes it difficult for a tribunal to be
fully informed unless the pertinent law is presented by the lawyer in the
cause. A tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable law is better able
to make a fair and accurate determination of the matter before it. The ad-
versary system contemplates that each lawyer will present and argue the ex-
isting law in the light most favorable to his client. Where a lawyer knows of
legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction directly adverse to the position
of his client, he should inform the tribunal of its existence unless his adver-
sary has done so, but having made such disclosure, he may challenge its
soundness in whole or in part." Model Code of Professional Responsibility
EC 7-23 (1979).
Id.
160. 625 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
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personally litigated. 161 Obviously, counsel had stretched the
limits of advocacy.
Opponents of imposition of sanctions such as those imposed
in the above two cases charge that the sanctions will produce a
more timid bar. It is feared that the result will be a change in
the basic notion of advocacy which is rooted in the classic and
common law legal tradition. On the other hand, judges, such
as Judge Schwarzer of the United States District Court of the
Northern District of California, have made clear their views on
sanctions. Judge Schwarzer, in an article in the Federal Rules
Decisions in 1985, wrote:
Unlike the polemicist haranguing the public from his
soapbox in the park, the lawyer enjoys the privilege of a
professional license that entitles him to entry into the jus-
tice system. . . . [he is obligated] to conduct himself in a
manner consistent with the proper functioning of that
system. 162
Increasingly, judges are critically examining every aspect of
the pretrial lawyering process and cautiously exploring the na-
ture and the extent of the power provided by Rule 11. They
are demanding that legal citations and factual allegations con-
tained in briefs and moving documents be founded on some-
thing more than a "good faith" belief that they exist. False or
misleading statements of law or fact as well as omission of con-
trolling authority may well result in sanctions. Previously ac-
cepted explanations for errors may no longer be tolerated.
For example, it is common for an out-state law firm to associ-
ate itself with local counsel when it has a client in a jurisdiction
where it has no office. In some jurisdictions, such association
is required. In the past, local counsel has played little or no
role in the actual handling of the lawsuit. Motions and other
documents were prepared by out-state counsel, but with local
counsel's name signed to them. The nature of the arrange-
161. Id. The court stated as follows:
The Court finds it reprehensible that plaintiffs counsel . . . omitted Bellanca
and Del Percio from the supporting memorandum of law, especially, when he
personally represented respondents in Del Percio. . . . It is abundantly evi-
dent to the Court that plaintiffs counsel are aware of the Florida Supreme
Court decisions and that they deliberately chose not to cite that case and
Bellanca, the controlling United States Supreme Court case, let alone at-
tempt to further distinguish them . ...
Id. at 1547.
162. Schwarzer, infra note 129, at 184.
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ment, and "good faith" shielded local counsel from blame for
misleading, frivolous, or otherwise poorly presented pretrial
motions or briefs. Under the new Rule 11, the shield has been
removed.
The severity of sanctions among lawyers may vary according
to experience, specialty, and responsibility. Lawyers holding
themselves out as specialists may be held to a higher standard
than that applied to a novice. Neither, however, will be ex-
cused from compliance with the Rule. 63 Senior partners can-
not escape responsibility for poorly prepared or misleading
motions. The excuse by a senior partner that "a new associate
prepared the document" and "I didn't have time prior to the
hearing to 'really' review the research" may well fall on unsym-
pathetic ears. Counsel will be shielded, of course, where the
state of the law is in flux or is nonexistent.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS OF RULE 11
The increasing number of reported Rule 11 decisions at the
federal level is an indication of its potency. As courts escalate
their demand for compliance with the Rule, the variety of situ-
ations in which it will be applied will likewise increase. For ex-
ample, in United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local No. 115
v. Armour & Co., 164 the plaintiff filed a claim against the defend-
ant contending it had refused to arbitrate when, in fact, it had
not been asked to arbitrate.' 65 After the defendant informed
the plaintiff that it would arbitrate the claim, plaintiff filed an
amended complaint charging the same refusal. When impos-
ing a $7,500 fine as a sanction against the plaintiff, the court
declared that there was no longer a need to make a threshold
163. In Huettig & Schromm, Inc. v. Landscape Contractors Council of N. Cal.,
582 F. Supp. 1519 (N.D. Cal. 1984) the court discussed the different standards as
follows:
One of the relevant circumstances is the experience and standing of the at-
torneys in question. Counsel in this case are not newly admitted to the bar
or engaged as general practitioners not well versed in labor law. The com-
plaint is signed by a partner of the San Francisco firm of Littler, Mendelson,
Fastiff & Tichy admitted to the bar for twelve years, and an associate of that
firm seven years at the bar. Both hold themselves out as specializing in la-
bor law . . . Given the claimed expertise and experience of these attorneys,
a strong inference arises that their bringing of an action such as this was for
an improper purpose.
Id. at 1522.
164. 106 F.R.D. 345 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
165. Id. at 347.
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finding of subjective bad faith. A court must "examine
whether the claim was reasonable in light of the existing law
and facts, and the standard is one of reasonableness under the
circumstances."166
The question of how courts arrive at the amount of the po-
tential financial penalty assessed against a lawyer violating the
Rule is gaining considerable attention. The court, in United
Food, held that Rule 1 1 authorizes only "reasonable fees, not
necessarily actual fees."' 67 It noted that "assessment of fees
against a nonprevailing litigant must be fair and reasonable
based upon the particular circumstances of the case."' 168 He
also observed that there was a duty on the part of each party to
dispose of frivolous lawsuits quickly using the least expensive
alternative. 1
69
Another issue facing judges is what facts, if any, will mitigate
imposition of sanctions. Should the mere absence of willful
misconduct automatically mitigate the amount of financial
sanctions to be applied? In Weisman v. Rivlin, 170 the court felt
the absence of willfulness was important. The court reduced
the amount of the sanction because of the absence of
willfulness. '7'
An example of how far Rule 11 may be pushed can be found
in such cases as AM International, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 172
There the court rejected a request to strike the brief of counsel
found in violation of Rule 11 in favor of assessing a fine. The
brief submitted to the court contained a footnote which the
court described as a "conscious, sly innuendo, juxtaposing two
literally true facts in such a way as to imply that [the plaintiff] is
a liar whose falsehoods were designed to stonewall discov-
ery."' 173 The court concluded that Kodak intended the
message of the footnote, rather than its literal truth, and im-
posed sanctions.
Harassing and delaying tactics through the filing of frivolous
166. Id.
167. Id. at 349.
168. Id. (quoting Tedeschi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 579 F.
Supp. 657, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)) (which arose while the old Rule 11 was in effect).
169. Id. at 350.
170. 598 F. Supp. 724 (D.C. 1984).
171. Id. at 727.
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but nevertheless costly motions are being tolerated less. In
North American Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 174 the trial
judge assessed the sum of $28,800 against counsel personally
as a sanction for having filed a frivolous motion to disqualify
the opposing lawyers. 75 The court concluded that counsel
knew the facts, thus demonstrating the absence of merit in the
disqualification motion. The court observed:
No purpose has been served by the instant motion other
than to harass plaintiff and his counsel and to delay these
proceedings further. The time has come to call a halt, or at
least to have the burden of these puerile litigation tactics
fall on counsel, where it belongs, rather than on the client
or the court. . . .Counsel had knowledge of all the neces-
sary facts long before this motion was instituted, and thus
could only have made such a groundless motion in bad
faith. 17
6
Attorneys who are sanctioned by the trial court and take an
appeal on the issue are risking the possibility of additional fi-
nancial sanctions being assessed against them if their appeal is
unsuccessful. In Bartel Dental Books Co. v. Schultz, 177 the court
concluded that the lawyer for the appellants was attempting to
obfuscate the fact that his clients had no federal claim. 178 It
noted that counsel failed to offer even a good faith argument
for reversing the precedents that were "so hostile to his cli-
ents' claims."'' 79 Using stern language, the court indicated its
impatience with counsel and their arguments:
Bartel's and Mapleton's counsel in this case should have
been on notice that our patience with frivolous appeals is at
an end. (citations omitted) We refer him to our 'stern
warning that the United States Courts are not powerless to
protect the public, including litigants who appear before the
Courts, from the depredations of those. . .who hold them-
selves out as attorneys but who abuse the process of the
Courts." 80
Harsh language, an award of double costs and attorney fees,
and a remand to determine the amounts and appropriate ap-
174. 83 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
175. Id. at 299.
176. Id. at 296-97.
177. 786 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1986).
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portionment of them between the client and his attorney were
the result in Hale v. Harney.' 81 The court stated that, "[n]either
we nor the trial courts sit to serve as implements of financial
torture and delay, to be applied to hapless parties at the plea-
sure of counsel."'
82
The Eighth Circuit has similarly indicated its displeasure
with frivolous appeals, 83 although it has exercised restraint in
assessing penalties. In Boomer v. United States, 184 the pro se tax-
payer appellant was ordered by the Eighth Circuit to pay
double costs and five hundred dollars in damages. 185 In Nagy
v. Jostens, Inc., 186 the appellees were awarded $2,500 on the
ground the appeal was frivolous.' 87
CONCLUSION
It is debatable whether Rule 1 1 will ever be viewed as "es-
sential to the administration of justice,"' 88 or "absolutely es-
sential" for the functioning of the judiciary.' 8 9 Nevertheless, it
is acquiring increased judicial recognition as a powerful tool
for control of court dockets. The potential impact of this Rule
should not be underestimated. As illustrated by several of the
cases examined in this Article, the Rule is potent.
The need for the judicial system to function effectively must
be balanced against the right of the American advocate to
forcefully, creatively challenge the law in an arena where new
thoughts, ideas, and suggestions are, while not always wel-
comed, nevertheless protected from unwarranted suppression
because of the threat of severe financial penalties.
As demonstrated by this Article, there is an immediate need
for standards to assist the judiciary when applying Rule 11, as
well as to provide effective notice to lawyers and pro se litigants
who are subject to it. Procedural due process questions should
be given prelitigation discussion and resolution. Standards
181. 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986).
182. Id. at 692.
183. See Nagy v. Jostens, Inc., Nos. 85-5237, 85-5266 (8th Cir. filed Mar. 31,
1986); Boomer v. United States, 755 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1985).
184. 755 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1985).
185. Id. at 697.
186. Nos. 85-5237, 85-5266 (8th Cir. filed Mar. 31, 1986).
187. Id. at 4.
188. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924).
189. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960).
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should be established so that only in the rarest case would fi-
nancial penalties or other sanctions be imposed without notice
and an opportunity to be heard. 190 Procedures such as those
used in Link should be discouraged.
Standards will promote uniformity of application of the Rule
among the judiciary and afford both judges and litigants an op-
portunity to efficaciously evaluate them. Questions which
could be handled through the establishment of standards
range from the need for an adequate record for appeal and the
detail required in a court's findings, to the issue of whether
"system costs" may be a legitimate consideration calculating
the amount a litigant should be fined.
Statutes, ethical canons, and lawyering customs need exami-
nation in the context of Rule 11 if appropriate lawyering ad-
monition proceedings within the setting of a free and open
litigation system can be fully developed. Defining which costs
may be considered and which fees may be included in arriving
at an appropriate fine need examination. Should an errant at-
torney, for example, be required to satisfy the full range of ex-
cess costs when his or her conduct causes the other party to
incur costs and fees which would not otherwise have been in-
curred including witness fees, printing, attorney fees, and the
costs of the forum itself? Questions such as those raised in
Eash v. Riggin Trucking Inc., 191 should be addressed before they
occur. There the district court ordered a lawyer to pay the
government the cost of impaneling a jury because the judge
felt he had unjustifiably delayed settlement negotiations and
caused unnecessary costs to be imposed on the system. 192
A fundamental philosophical issue integrally related to Rule
11 is whether the Rule is silently eroding the foundation un-
derlying the American rule against allowing attorney fees for
the winning party. This nation's democratic system of dispute
resolution was founded upon this concept.
Mature consideration and informed discussion from all rele-
vant quarters should be encouraged so that a comprehensive
and integrated series of standards surrounding Rule 11 may be
190. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767. A court may not disbar an attorney without
fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364,
375 (1868).
191. 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
192. Id. at 571-72.
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established. Although local rules may not be used to effectuate
basic procedural innovations, they can be effective in outlining
and explaining the meaning of the "basic" rules. Thus, local
rules are the most appropriate setting for Rule 11 guidelines
and standards.
The judiciary has sharpened its sword with the amendments
to Rule 11. Most believe that this is a commendable and re-
sponsible action; it was, if anything, too long delayed. Most
also agree that citizens with legitimate disputes should not be
made to wait a year while frivolous cases which should have
never been placed into the system bog it down. Nevertheless,
the sharpened sword must be carefully controlled so it will not
cut into the basic fabric of our democratic system of dispute
resolution. The time is now to develop standards to assure
that the worst fears of the critics of Rule 11 are not realized.
37
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